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Abstract 
Having worked with healthcare and medical trainees 
and practitioners for a number of years as medical 
educators, we have often noticed a glazed, irritated or 
frustrated look in the eyes of many of them when the 
terms reflective practice or reflection are used. These 
two sets of words have come to be known as the ‘R’ 
words. This has prompted us to consider the modern 
origins of the concept of reflective practice and also the 
etymological roots and philosophical foundation of the 
meaning of the term ‘practice’. At the same time, this 
has raised issues of who owns the process and product 
of reflective practice (e.g. individuals; peers; tutors; 
assessors) and whether the outcomes should be 
formally assessed given the associated ethical and 
authenticity dilemmas that often seem to arise from 
such assessment. 
 
Keywords: healthcare trainees and educators; 
reflective practice; etymological roots; ethical and 
authenticity dilemmas. 
 
The modern origins of reflective practice 
 
Dewey (1910; 1933) used the term reflective thought 
and did not essentially consider the concept of self-
reflection. Schön (1983; 1987) in his respective, 
celebrated works, The Reflective Practitioner and 
Educating the Reflective Practitioner, realised that he 
was building on the work of Dewey when he provided 
the outcomes of his own research into what at the time 
was regarded as ‘fresh insights’ into how professional 
educators might behave with regard to their reflecting 
on their own practice. Bolton (1999: 206) reminds us: 
 
Reflective practice has been a buzz activity 
since Schön (1983, 1987); the analysis of 
critical incidents has been a main feature in 
nurse education since Benner (Benner, 1984; 
Benner and Wrubel, 1989) 
 
Reflective practice has been widely adopted in a range 
of higher education and professional settings, including 
education, health sciences and leadership and there has 
not always been agreement on the definition of 
reflection or exactly what constitutes reflective practices 
in a higher education context. Indeed some authors 
(Korthagen, 2001; Ottesen, 2007), in their criticism of 
Schön, have stressed that reflective practice is generally 
addressed in individual terms, which Engeström (1994) 
blames on an individualist and Cartesian bias.  
 
Zeichner and Liston (1996 18) have attributed this 
conceptual limitation to Schön’s (1983) theory, in which 
‘apart from the context of mentoring, reflection is 
portrayed [. . .] as largely a solitary process involving a 
teacher and his or her situation, and not as a social 
process taking place within a learning community’.  
Moreover Schön has been criticised for not addressing 
or perhaps not even recognising that there is a need for 
critical reflection (Fook, 2002; Brookfield, 1990, as cited 
in Morley 2007: 62) and this notion was also highlighted 
by Carr and Kemmis (1986) in the context of action 
research where they pointed out that adversarial peer 
criticism and the practice of reflexivity are both 
necessary factors in order to make reflective practice 
more comprehensive. Additionally, Fairclough (2001) 
adds to the criticism of Schön by stating that the latter 
did not acknowledge the significant contribution that 
the use of language makes within reflective practice 
because language is often controlled by power 
relationships and indeed can also help to perpetuate 
such relationships by acting as a symbolic regulator of 
thought and behaviour. The neglect of the significance 
of language, meaning and narrative is a theme that is 
also adopted by Thompson and Pascal (2012), who 
contend that Schön’s writings do not address the 
important elements of meaning making, a process at the 
heart of the ‘reflective conversation with the situation’ 
of which Schön (1983) spoke. 
 
It seems clear, then, that the work of Schön (1983; 
1987), whilst regarded at the time of publication, and 
even now, as being insightful and pivotal with regard to 
the formation of professional teachers’ continuous 
development based on reflective practice, has attracted 
sufficient criticism as to warrant closer scrutiny of the 
epistemological foundations on which the edifice of 
reflective practice has been constructed. 
 
The etymological roots and philosophical foundation of 
the meaning of the term ‘practice’ 
 
Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics (Rackham, 1934) 
introduces the term praxis and defines it as action for its 
own sake, not as a means to an end. He also employs 
the term phronesis to convey the concept of practical 
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wisdom that is necessarily invoked during the mental 
process of praxis. In other words, he uses the term 
praxis to provide a notion of action in the moment, 
using knowledge gained from experience, which is 
designed to facilitate refinement and improvement of 
that action. In contrast, he uses the term poiesis to 
define action as a means to an end, as in the production 
of something. He also introduces the word techne (its 
original Greek meaning embodying the combined sense 
of skill and craft and subsuming another strand, that of 
artistry) to provide the notion that poiesis leads to a 
product that has been brought about by skill. 
 
To sharpen this point, Aristotle wishes to make the 
reader aware that contained within the idea of praxis is 
practical wisdom, that is to say the person who is 
carrying out the praxis (the practitioner) does so by 
engaging in thoughtful reflection that is an inseparable 
component of praxis (practice).  
 
The ‘re-birth’ of this Aristotelian concept of the ‘good’ 
 
The ‘re-birth’ of this Aristotelian concept of the ‘good’ 
might arguably be attributed to Martin Heidegger when 
he introduces it in his reading of Book 6 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics within the framework of a 1924–25 
lecture course on Plato’s Sophist. He highlighted poiesis 
and praxis and emphasised the essential difference 
between their meanings, namely the former being a 
means to an end and the latter being an end in itself. 
Hannah Arendt was a member of the audience when 
Heidegger presented the ‘rebirth’ of praxis and she later 
used the term vita activa in her work entitled The 
Human Condition (1958) to convey the notion of praxis 
and the link between action and language. 
 
Both Heidegger and Arendt rekindled Aristotle’s concept 
that the pursuit of ‘good’ for the sake of individuals and 
society was conceived as an integral part of praxis 
(practice). To achieve ‘good’, practitioners would use 
the practical wisdom of their specialist occupation and 
would constantly reflect critically on their practice so as 
to aim at achieving the ‘good’. Hence the notion of 
(critical) reflection was an integral part of praxis; the art 
of praxis was to carry it out with reason (meta logou). 
For Aristotle, the use of the term ‘reflective’ would 
almost certainly have seemed to be tautologous. 
Perhaps Freire (1972: 119) comes very close to affirming 
this idea when he states: ‘Men’s activity consists of 
action and reflection: it is praxis, it is transformation of 
the world’.   
 
 As an interesting adjunct to this point, Linda de Cossart 
delivered a keynote speech, Developing the Wise Doctor 
at the Postgraduate Medical Education and Training 
Board (PMETB) 2009 conference for stakeholders 
(October 2009). Within this speech, she stressed that 
the purpose of PMETB was to facilitate doctors being 
able to articulate the thinking behind their decisions; 
she emphasized that wise doctors are not unthinking 
professionals who merely follow protocols but who 
make their own professional judgments within the 
uncertain and messy environment of clinical practice. 
She made the assertion that in order to become wise, 
doctors need to be given opportunities to be innovative 
and ‘think outside the box’ within a well-supervised 
environment. To reach this stage of their development, 
they need to have been schooled within the traditions of 
medical practice with the values that such traditions 
embrace.   
 
The terms reflective practice and reflective practitioner 
are tautologous 
 
Given the preceding consideration of the etymological 
roots of the meaning of the term ‘practice’, it is our 
contention that the terms reflective practice and 
reflective practitioner are tautologous on the grounds 
that the root meaning of the term practice (praxis) 
conveys the notion that reflective thought is an integral 
aspect of the process of praxis. It would perhaps have 
seemed strange to Aristotle to have talked about 
reflective practice because the concept for him seems to 
have been contained in one semantic expression.  
 
Whilst it might seem to be a non sequitur, this could 
partly explain why some professionals tend to react 
adversely when the terms reflection and reflective are 
used because there seems to be an overemphasis of a 
phenomenon that is natural to some professionals, 
namely thinking critically about their practice. Perhaps 
they have an instinctive understanding that practice in 
the professional context involves critical thinking and 
that, therefore, the need to stress the terms reflective 
and reflection could be perceived by them as patronising 
and condescending. 
 
Whilst no practitioners have expressed verbatim the fact 
that they have an innate understanding that practice 
involves critical reflection, some have certainly vocalised 
their displeasure at the use of the terms on the grounds 
that they appear to be laden with patronisation and 
condescension. We have, therefore, alluded to the fact 
that there could be a systemic issue with the term itself 
– reflective practice – namely that it rests uneasily on 
the critical ears of most practitioners because they 
themselves seem to be in little doubt that within their 
daily professional practice they carry out critical thinking 
with regards to their daily professional encounters; we 
have also suggested that sometimes the use of the two 
terms causes eyes to glaze over and leads to 
displeasure. 
 
To extend the consideration of the roots of the meaning 
of praxis, it is important to note that Aristotle 
emphasises how practical wisdom (phronesis) is 
concerned with ‘the capacity for determining what is 
good for both the individual and the community’ 
(Melaney, 2006: 467). This concept of ‘the good’ is 
rooted in praxis, from which the word (practice) and its 
notion are derived. Practitioners, according to Aristotle, 
can never anticipate the outcome of their praxis, which 
is conducted through the medium of practical wisdom 
(phronesis), until the process has been completed. In 
this sense, each situation in which praxis is applied is 
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unique and the desired outcome is for the ‘good’ of the 
individual and society as a whole. 
 
For praxis to be conducted whereby there is a moral 
dimension in that both the individual and society in 
general benefit, the prevailing cultural environment, we 
contend, needs to be one that promotes transparency 
and professional regard for the practitioners. They must 
feel that it is safe to behave openly and must be 
unreservedly confident that the outcome of their praxis 
will be received in the spirit of it being for the ‘good’ of 
the individual and society.  
 
The issues of transparency, trust and confidence within 
a professional environment 
 
The issues of transparency, trust and confidence within 
a professional environment that should be built on 
respect for practitioners are ones that always seem to 
emerge within our discussions with students. In our 
roles as medical educators, working with undergraduate 
and postgraduate students on clinical education 
modules, we have directly experienced healthcare and 
medical practitioners expressing reservations about 
reflective practice as regards potential end-users of their 
written reflections. Some state that they would never 
write a ‘hard-hitting’ account of their actions, thoughts 
and reflections on their professional life and activities, 
which had been the result of individual or deeply trusted 
peer soul-searching, with the expectation that it would 
be read by a third party (e.g. an assessor) who might use 
the information to form a judgement of them and/or 
share it with another interested party. In other words, 
they feel that the written outcomes of genuine 
reflective practice should be confidential and remain 
within the private domain of those who principally own 
it, seemingly on the grounds that they are not confident 
that the cultural environment in which they practise can 
be trusted not to misuse the outcomes of their praxis. 
 
This question of confidentiality is raised by Ghaye (2007) 
within his consideration of student nurses’ reflective 
portfolios; he explains that student nurses have declared 
a reluctance to expose their innermost thoughts, 
feelings and concerns to a third party (namely, an 
assessor) whom they simply do not know on an intimate 
basis.  Perhaps it is akin to writing one’s personal diary 
about one’s innermost thoughts and then committing it 
to a third party to read. Soul-baring activities might only 
be done by some ‘as a whisper in the depth of the forest 
at midnight when they are alone’ or in the protective 
custody of trusted friends and loved ones. 
 
Ghaye (2007) extends his focus on this topic by asking 
what ethical issues arise when students are requested to 
submit reflective portfolios as a mandatory component 
of their undergraduate degree course. He suggests that 
it might, indeed, be unethical for a university to make 
such a request without there being a strict ethical code 
of conduct for both students and staff to abide by when 
the former is involved in the production of such 
portfolios and the latter in the assessment of the same. 
Ghaye (2007) feels that there is a tension between the 
desire for students to make authentic declarations and 
their unwillingness to reveal such declarations to an 
‘unknown’ audience.  
 
Within our roles as medical educators, we have spoken 
with undergraduate medical students who indicate that 
reflective practice is often considered as something that 
has to be done to appease staff and that the whole 
process is something that seems to be of great interest 
to teachers and yet not students. In contrast, written 
tests on medical knowledge and Objective Structured 
Clinical Examinations (OSCEs) seem to take priority in 
the minds of these students.  
 
At the same time, we are aware that some small-group 
learning activities within undergraduate medical degree 
courses consist of students sharing with their peers and 
tutors the outcomes of their reflection upon significant 
learning events experienced during their practice. 
Adventitiously some students have told us that they feel 
the need to invent events where none are considered to 
have occurred rather than be honest and declare that 
they feel that there is nothing significant to comment 
upon within a particular practice period. They feel that it 
is too risky to declare that they have experienced 
nothing that they regard as significant and worthy of 
sharing with their peers in the public domain on the 
grounds that they might be considered as not having 
engaged critically with their practice and, hence, might 
be deemed as ‘inadequate’ according to specified 
assessment criteria. It is, therefore, easier for them to 
‘tick a box and play the game’.  
 
‘Strategic’ deception 
 
Hobbs (2007) highlights this issue of students presenting 
invented accounts of their learning experience in order 
to satisfy the demands of assessors in the context of 
Teaching English for Speakers of Other Languages 
(TESOL) courses and refers to the practice as ‘strategic’ 
deception. This observation might be aligned to the 
term ‘espoused theory and theory in use’ which was 
coined by Argyris and Schön (1974) when they wished to 
convey the idea that sometimes individuals declare their 
preferred practice or modus operandi to be in one form 
whilst in reality they behave in a very different fashion. 
It is conceded that the evidence of such game-playing is 
only available through ‘research’ data captured 
adventitiously; any potential criticism, however, of not 
employing a more structured method of data capture 
might be countered by stating that such student 
revelations were made within settings that were 
perceived to be ‘politically-neutral’; in other words, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that students spoke 
openly and honestly about being reluctant or disinclined 
to reveal publicly, either in writing or orally, the 
outcomes of their reflections on their practice. 
 
There is then a dilemma for some students; even if they 
are of the persuasion that reflective practice is an 
integral aspect of their development as individual 
students and professionals, the need for the public 
declaration of the same through mandatory formative 
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and summative assessment might lead to them adopting 
a dual-aspect system for reporting the outcomes of their 
reflective practice, namely contrived accounts for the 
public domain and genuine accounts for their ‘tried and 
trusted’ private domains.  
 
The ownership of the process and product of reflective 
practice 
 
The latter observation leads us into a discussion on the 
ownership of the process and product of reflective 
practice. It would seem reasonable to suggest that 
whether reflective practice is conducted individually or 
collectively, it is ultimately owned by the individual on 
whose behalf the activity has been conducted, in other 
words by the individual who initiated the process. There 
might be claims that the intellectual ownership belongs 
to both the individual and other parties who contributed 
to the process and product of such reflective practice 
but there would still appear to be justification in 
awarding absolute ownership of the same to the 
‘originator’. 
 
If that contention can safely be proffered, it would also 
seem reasonable to state that the owners have an 
ethical right to reject ‘invitations’ to exhibit the 
outcomes of their reflective practice within the public 
domain, whatever form that public domain may take. As 
discussed earlier, Ghaye (2007) raises the issue of the 
ethics of making public the outcomes of reflective 
practice in the form of reflective portfolios. Moreover, 
should the owners feel coerced into ‘unveiling’ their 
products and feel unable to resist because they feel that 
such behaviour might have an adverse impact on their 
current studies and future career prospects, they might 
resort to presenting fictitious accounts of their reflective 
practice in much the same way as highlighted by Hobbs 
(2007). 
 
In his adventitious research work with student nurses as 
a teaching practitioner, Hilsdon (2005) explains that they 
often confided in him their feelings of unease at being 
requested to submit for formal assessment their written 
reflective accounts of what they had learned from 
working on the wards. Hilsdon is silent on whether the 
student nurses invented such accounts but further 
explains that some student nurses would make strategic 
omissions from their reflective writing in order to avoid 
potential conflict with superordinates. 
 
As a corollary, Hilsdon (2005: 62-63) also states that 
‘student nurses are encouraged to use models such as 
those of Gibbs (1988) and Johns (1993, 1998)’. There are 
some very sound arguments against structured written 
reflective accounts in that structure limits and distorts 
the very response the exercise is designed to elicit and 
risks encouraging mindless ‘recipe following’ rather than 
insightful analysis (Boud and Walker, 1998; Branch and 
Paranjape, 2002).  
 
In mitigation, Johns (2004: 19) himself writes: 
 
I must emphasise that all models of reflection 
are merely devices to help the practitioner 
access reflection, they are not a prescription of 
what reflection is … From a reflective 
perspective, the practitioner will view all 
models for their value, rather than accepting 
the authority of the model on face value. 
 
The assessment of reflective writing within the public 
domain 
 
We now return to our earlier point, namely that the 
pursuit of ‘good’ for the sake of individuals and society 
was conceived by Aristotle as an integral part of praxis 
(practice).To achieve ‘good’, practitioners would use the 
practical wisdom of their specialist occupation and 
would constantly reflect critically on their practice so as 
to aim at achieving the ‘good’. 
 
In light of comments made in this article about the 
reservations that students have about placing their 
written reflective accounts within the public domain and 
that some subsequently resort to creating fictitious 
accounts in order to avoid potential conflicts with their 
superordinates, there would appear to be a significant 
gap between the aspirations of the positive employment 
of reflective practice as proclaimed by Aristotle and the 
way in which the process and the practice of reflective 
practice is handled and managed by students, tutors and 
assessors within the curricula of clinical education. 
 
The demand for student written reflective accounts to 
be assessed might be rooted in the genuine belief that 
such a practice demonstrates the rigour that universities 
attach to the process and product of reflective practice 
and that not to assess the same would represent a 
systemic flaw in the structure of the curricula, which 
includes assessment. Boud (2001: 5) considered the 
benefits of student journal writing as a medium for 
facilitating critical reflection alongside the practice of 
such reflective writing being assessed and concluded the 
following:  
The more that journal writing moves into the 
realm of critical reflection, that is, the 
questioning of taken-for-granted assumptions 
about oneself, one’s group, or the conditions 
in which one operates, the more it is necessary 
to consider the inhibiting gaze of others. The 
more that journals are used to focus on those 
characteristics of reflection such as ‘perplexity, 
hesitation, doubt’ (Dewey 1933), ‘inner 
discomforts’ (Brookfield 1987) or ‘disorienting 
dilemmas’ (Mezirow 1990), the greater the 
account which needs to be taken of the 
interventions of those who may read one’s 
writing. 
 
At the same time the policy of assessing reflective 
practice might be rooted in the perceived need by 
universities to coerce their students into conducting the 
process and product of reflective practice because there 
is an implicit or explicit belief held by staff that students 
might not otherwise embed reflective practice into their 
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studies as an integral aspect of their learning and 
development. 
 
In whatever way the behaviour of staff and students is 
interpreted, the authors of this article contend that 
somehow the essential reason for praxis (reflective 
practice) as conceived by Aristotle has been, albeit 
unwittingly, hijacked and distorted by tutors and 
assessors so that in many cases the potential ‘fruits’ of 
the process and product of genuine student reflective 
practice are often translated into invented accounts that 
exist to satisfy the demands of internal and external 
parties who are superordinates by virtue of their 
professional status. 
 
The United Kingdom Foundation Programme Office 
(UKFPO) has most recently published (August, 2013) up-
to-date guidance on the use of e-portfolios for 
postgraduate trainees undertaking Foundation Level 1 
and 2 (F1 and F2) and Specialty Training (ST) provision. It 
states that new and existing FI trainees will adopt the 
model of reflective practice that was prescribed by 
Gibbs’ Reflective Cycle (1988) whilst current F2 and ST 
trainees may use both the Gibbs’ model and that 
currently in use, which is a more free-text model than 
that of Gibbs. Gibbs’ cycle tends to be used in nursing 
and other professional healthcare settings in order to 
provide practitioners and trainees with a structure for 
reflection. This model, however, is not without its critics.  
Zeichner and Liston (1996) argue that practitioners 
should not individually focus on whether or not their 
practice works but should be more concerned with a 
critical examination of how their practice can precipitate 
change and their commitment to quality in wider 
institutional and social contexts. 
 
Our concerns with the use of Gibbs’ Reflective Cycle 
(1988) within trainee e-portfolios 
 
We have our own significant concerns with this 
approach to reflection and reflective writing. Firstly, 
there does not seem to be an obvious awareness on the 
part of UKFPO of the need to be culturally sensitive 
when asking trainee practitioners to engage in reflection 
and reflective writing. Some students might not respond 
positively to the conceptual and practical demands of 
reflective practice if they are not familiar with having to 
do so within their own learning cultures which are not 
founded on western-oriented philosophy (Sung-Chan 
and Yuen-Tsang, 2006). Secondly, reflective learning 
(Halton et al., 2007) may be instinctive for some trainees 
but there is still a need for it to be promoted and refined 
within a learning environment and culture that is based 
on critical enquiry so that the full potential of its 
benefits are realised. Thirdly, there are some trainees 
for whom reflection and reflective writing are both 
unfamiliar and unpractised. Accordingly, such trainees 
might well need initial, and arguably ongoing, focussed 
support from staff and experienced peers to appreciate 
and adopt the principles and practices of reflection and 
reflective writing. When considering the disposition and 
the subsequent  learning and developmental needs of 
such individuals, Halton et al. (2007: 521) note that 
‘while reflective learning is an iterative process, it is also 
useful to view it as a stage process, requiring higher 
levels of time and support from staff in the beginning 
stages’. 
 
Fourthly, the model prescribed by Gibbs (1988) is likely 
to encourage the trainees to approach reflection and 
reflective writing on an individual basis and in a 
superficial, reactive way as opposed to collectively and 
in a critically reflective manner, which echoes the 
Aristotelian concept of praxis. Fifthly, the requirement 
for the trainees to publish the outcomes of their 
reflections within their e-portfolios is likely to dissuade 
them from being open and honest because of the issues 
of trust and confidentiality which often attend reflective 
writing when it appears in the public domain. 
 
Apart from the apparent futility of trainee practitioners 
publishing highly superficial or ‘invented’ accounts of 
their reflections on their practice in the public domain, 
and the attendant waste of their energy and resources 
in producing such ‘false’ accounts, this behaviour would 
also seem to be incompatible with renewed public 
appeals for clinicians to be transparent in their conduct 
and to insist that their fellows behave in the same way. 
Such calls for transparency in the pursuit of maintaining 
and improving clinical standards in the interest of 
patient safety form the basis of Recommendation 173, 
which is contained within the Executive Summary of the 
Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Public Inquiry (Francis, 2013). It states:  
 
Every healthcare organisation and everyone 
working for them must be honest, open and 
truthful in all their dealings with patients and 
the public, and organisational and personal 
interests must never be allowed to outweigh 
the duty to be honest, open and truthful. 
 
In light of this recommendation which advocates 
‘transparency, openness and candour’ (ibid), it would 
also seem appropriate to consider the following words 
of Ludmerer (2010), who states in his commentary on 
understanding the Flexner Report (1910) on Medical 
Education in the United States and Canada: 
 
He (Flexner) was uncompromising in his view 
that medicine is a public trust and that the 
profession and its educational system exist to 
serve. These values, he argued, are timeless, 
regardless of the professional and social 
circumstances of the moment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We feel that embodied within the Francis (2013) and 
Flexner (1910) Reports are the notions of clinicians’ (and 
non-clinicians’) professional integrity and responsibility 
for patient care and safety that are predicated on the 
cultural values of honesty and trust within a non-
threatening environment. At the same time we argue 
that these cultural values of honesty and trust within a 
non-threatening environment need to exist in order for 
Critical and Reflective Practice in Education Volume 4 2015 
 
16 
 
trainees and practitioners to undertake critical, 
profound reflection on practice in a way that yields rich, 
genuine produce that can be used to engender creative 
developments for their learning and development as 
well as that of their institutions, their professions and 
society in general. We, therefore, maintain that the 
culture needed to sustain the notions of professional 
integrity and responsibility for patient care and safety 
and for critical reflective practice is comprised of the 
same elements, namely trust and confidence by and in 
all parties to participate openly, honestly and positively 
for the ‘good’ of the individual and society. 
 
This article has sought to highlight the complexities and 
challenges that reflection and reflective practice present 
for healthcare and medical trainees, practitioners, 
medical educators and, indeed, all parties involved 
directly and indirectly in the process. It argues that 
critical reflective practice should be conducted in a way 
that genuinely leads to improvements and 
developments within the settings that healthcare and 
medical professionals work, train, study and learn, 
namely the way that was enshrined within the 
Aristotelian notion of praxis. We contend that there 
should not be a formal requirement for the process and 
product of reflective practice to appear in the public 
domain as part of an assessment regime because this 
often tends to encourage superficial and fictitious 
accounts to be presented in order to afford some 
protection against real or imagined potential misuse of 
such information. Ultimately we feel that critical 
reflective practice should be so embedded within the 
professional practice and culture of healthcare and 
medical trainees and practitioners that attempts to 
isolate and fragment it in order to satisfy assessment 
regimes are vain and futile, and perhaps betray a lack of 
belief and security on the part of those who instigate 
such regimes.        
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